EX PACTO ACTIO NON NASCITUR.
Ex nudo"pacto inter cives Romanos actio non nascitur.-Paul. Sent.

2, 14, I.

Nuda pactio obligationein non parit.-Ulp. in Dig. 2, 14, 7, 4.

The history of this rule is the history of Roman contracts.
Yet a few of the salient points in the story may be summarily
sketched, for through them runs an interesting development
of law. parallel to that affecting the rule that the slave had
no personality,1 the rule that a wife held toward husband the
legal relation of daughter,2 and to the development of the
informal modes of acquiring property as equal to the formal
modes.
The modem civilian sees no line of cleavage between
pact, or convention, and contract; for the former, speaking
generally, is sanctioned by an action at law. The meeting
of the minds of the parties imposes the obligation. But
the law of Rome had a very different theory. We cite the
last two of the great classical jurists. Ulpian says: "A
simple pact creates no obligation." Paul says: "No right
of action at law arises from a mere pact." Ample testimony
to show that the Roman rule, that a mere convention could
not create an obligation, ground an action, was never abrogated. How, then, was it treated?
The Roman theory held that for a convention to become
binding in law it must be clothed with such a juristic form
as would transform it into a contract, would sanction it by
an action at law. The early law contained enough such
juristic forms to show a pretty complete system. Even the
extant fragments of the Twelve Tables mention s an old
contract "with the bronze and the scales," the nexuim, showing the quaint formalities of the symbolical sale for "spot
cash," with its "scale bearer" and the five witnesses. So
'See the writer's paper on Freedom and Slavery in Roman Law, Am.
Vol. 40 (N. S.), No. ii, page 637 ff.
'See the writer's paper on Some Viewpoints of Roman Law, etc.,
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long as the nexum involved an actual weighing out of uncoined metal, it could, of course, be used for loan contracts
only, but after it became a mere symbol any obligation to
pay a sum could be created by it whatever the cause was for
entering into it. Cicero tells us 4 that the Twelve Tables
had a formal contract using the religious form-the oath,
the sponsio. Probably this was the origin of the best known
of the formal contracts, which one might almost call the
"specialty" of the classical law, namely the contract by
dialogue, oral question and congruent answer, the "verbal"
contract or stipulatio. This form was capable of extension
to all possible promises. Further, we find a formal written
contract, literis, which must be entered in an account book
by the creditor with the debtor's consent.
The commoner agreements of Romans in the early state
could be made binding by setting them in such juristic
forms. But the simple meeting of minds had absolutely no
juristic significance. Formalism ruled a long time before
the dawn of the conception that a legal obligation could be
imposed without formalities-the idea of an informal contract.
So long a sway implies certain merits. What were they?
The advantages that formalism always has-precision and
certainty. The time elapsing between the meeting of the
minds and the actual formation of the contract permitted
mature reflection. Again, proof in early Rome being drawn
mainly from witnesses, the formality would grip the attention of the witness, and stick in his memory better than
would the termination of an often long and confused series
of proposals and counter proposals. Further, the judge was
freed from the burden of interpretation. Not only was the
question: "Was there a contract?" comparatively easy to
answer by: "Yes, if the formality was gone through," but
the question: "What was the content of the contract ?" did
not turn on subtle interpretation or variable considerations
of equity but on patent and substantial facts. The contract
itself clearly stated the object thereof. Judge or juror
could not remake it, add to it, or subtract from it. Interpretation being strict, both parties to the contract knew pre,Cic. De Off. 3, 31, IiI.
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cisely,-the creditor, what he would obtain; the debtor,
what he must perform.
These merits, however, involved correlative disadvantages. A formality always implies hindrance-the time required for it,-interference with other business. Furthermore, strictness itself of interpretation might prejudice the
interests of a party. The creditor could demand only what
had expressly been promised, and had no recourse if debtor
delayed execution, or showed bad faith. Take a case 5 on a
stipulatio to give the slave A. A. dies through neglect of
promissor. Decision, no recourse." For the creditor should
have required the debtor to promise the necessary care. So
the creditor who failed to insert a forfeit could get no damages for delay in execution. The debtor, too, was not
allowed to plead error, deceit, or constraint. However, in
an early stage of civilization, these disadvantages would
hardly be perceived. For contracts were infrequent acts
for which both parties had time fully to prepare the minds,
and the legal conscience probably had not developed sufficiently to be revolted by sporadic cases of inequity.
Rome and Roman civilization grew. Business as it grew
found this system cramping, and opened the eyes of the
law to its demerits. Transactions became so numerous that
speed was essential. This loss of time was unendurable.
The citizen traveling in a far off corner of the world-state,
or fighting her battles, could not come home to go through
the ancient Roman form. Must the business wait till Aulus
of Rome and Numerius of Syracuse can get together and go
through the oral dialogue? And, as court calendars filled
with contract cases, the public conscience, too, awoke to the
injustice in a system under which one party had no remedy
for the fraud or inhumanity of the other.
Such considerations led during the last years of the Republic and under the Empire, to a change in the spirit of the
law. This change showed itself sometimes in less strict
interpretation, sometimes in less strict formalities. The
rigors of interpretation equity also remedied in a measure,
for the praetor introduced remedies to meet the mischiefs
D. 45, 1, 9
o, faciendura tenetur. Loc. dr.
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of fraud and violence. Such considerations also led to the
creation of new contracts that were not formal, some of
them being of strict interpretation, others not of strict law.
These contracts were the "real" contracts, and the "consensual" contracts.
The earliest of the "real" contracts was the "loan for consumption," mutuum. In this A. lends to B. a "consumable,"
say money, B. to return an equal amount of like quality.
Originally such a loan would have required to make a legal
contract the secular formality "with bronze and scales,"
called nexum, or the religious formality in which B. took
an oath, the sponsio. In later days the parties would have
gone through the oral verbal formality, stipulatio, in which
A. asked: "Do you sacredly promise,-spondesnef" and B.
replied: "I do,-spondeo." Or the "literal" contract, literis,
would have been inscribed by A. with B.'s consent in A.'s
ledger. Still later the rule-very significant in the history
of law-obtained that, in default of the completion of the
formality the mere delivery of the consumables 7 created
the contract called mutuum, gave the right to bring an action
at law.
Mut-uum, or loan for consumption, was the earliest of the
"real" contracts. The law developed three other "real"
contracts that are well known: the loan for use (commodatum), the contract of deposit (depositum) and pawn
(pignus). But an older contract for obtaining the same
results as these three should be mentioned, the contract of
trust (fIducia), for through it the three received their beginnings.
The contract of trust was certainly used to give security
for payment of a debt and with regard to a deposit and
probably in case of a loan for use. The mode was as follows:
A. alienates the object to B. B. then enters into a pact or
convention to alienate the same object to A. at a stated time
or place-in case of deposit, upon the demand of A.; in case
of pledge for security, upon the payment of the principal
,debt. In all these cases the convention to return was called
a pact of trust (pactum fiduciae). Business had undoubtedly used it when the only sanction was moral, the
'Res quae primo usu consumuntur, as, e. g., wine oil, flour, money.
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fides of the recipient, long before the law would enforce it.
Later an action at law was allowed to one who had alienated
under a pact of trust, if the recipient did not execute the
pact, which thus became virtually a contract.
Yet it was awkward and indeed risky to loan or deposit
by the process of first divesting oneself of the property right
and then receiving a pact for the return of the property.
Naturally, it seemed simpler to divest oneself of the physical
possession, retaining the property right and the technical
possession. At this point that ever-recurring phenomenon
in the history of Roman law appears-the equitable remedies of the praetor. This "keeper of the people's conscience" s
had developed a series of injunctions (interdicta), which
protected mere possession. Under the contract of trust the
property right had passed over; now the property right is
held and temporary possession is turned over to one who
enters into a convention to return the possession. Thus
were developed the new pacts of loan, deposit and pawn.
Even after the law gave an action to enforce the contract
of trust, it refused legal remedies in the case of these new
pacts. Here equity came in again, and the praetor devised
and furnished remedies in equity. Equity, as so commonly
in the Roman system, but blazed the path for the civil law,
which eventually, in the last years of the Republic, reached
the point of allowing special actions called, respectively,
action on loan for use (actio commodati), or action on
deposit (actio depositi), and on pawn (actio pigneraticia).
At that moment other vital exceptions to the rule, ex pacto
actio non nascitur, had arisen. These pacts had become
contracts. The contract of trust naturally fell out of use
except for.security for debt where it had certain advantages.
This fact explains how it is that the classical jurists name
only four "real" contracts (arising, they say, re, "from the
thing," possession of which is given) :loan for consumption
(mutuurn), loan for use (commodaturn), deposit (depositurn), and pawn (pignus).
It was probably about the time when the formulary system of procedure at law began that there appeared the four
tSee the writer's paper on Justinian's Redaction. Am. LAW
Vol. 40 (N. S.), No. 4, page i99, note.
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contracts that are called consensual: sale, hire, agency and
partnership.9
Sale, or, as the Romans called it, "purchase and sale"
(emptio-venditio), is the contract by which one party engages to furnish the useful and permanent possession of an
object while the other party engages to pay in return a certain sum. Under the ancient formal system, to accomplish
these two objects it would have been necessary to have two
separate stipulationes, or verbal contracts, one from the
vendor, one from the vendee, each becoming in turn creditor
and debtor. Under the new system the vendor had as
remedy the specific action on sale (actio venditi) and the
vendee the specific action on purchase (actio empti), and
these were grounded in the mere consent, or meeting of
minds. So in the contract of "letting and hiring" (locatioconductio), under which the mere convention of one party
to furnish for a certain time the enjoyment of the thing,
or a certain amount of labor, and of the other party to pay
in return a sum of money grounded the respective actions,
on letting (actio locati) and on hiring (actio conducti). So
in the contract of agency (mandatum) which, on account of
the wide difference distinguishing it from the English
agency, it were wiser to call "mandate," and of which one
may say tentatively that one party charges the other who is
to act gratuitously: in this convention is grounded an action
on mandate (actio mandati). And, finally, in the contract
of partnership (societas), under which the simple pact to
devote something in common to a lawful aim in order to
obtain therefrom a reciprocal advantage, grounded for each
party the action on partnership (pro socio).
What now are the main differences that distinguish from
the old formal contracts these pacts that, in defiance of the
rule ex pacto actio non nascitur, have obtained recognition
in Roman law as imposing legal obligations, as themselves
contracts,-namely, the "real" and the "consensual" contracts? Their most salient difference consists in the fact
that they are not formal. Their validity does not depend
on the condition that certain formalities shall have been
carried out. Their only necessary conditions are those per'Gai. Inst. 3,

135 ff.

Just. Inst. 3,

22,

pr., i.
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taining to their actual substance, conditions derived from
their economic purpose, from that publica utilitas by virtue
of which they have been excepted from the general rule,
ex pacto actio non nascitur,-raisedfrom the nothingness
of pacts to be contracts. Sale binds A. and B. not because
they have gone through a formality, but because their minds
have met upon the thing and upon the price. That which
renders the gratuitous loan for consumption (mutuum)
actionable is not a formality imposed by law, but the handing over of the consumable without which there could be
no loan.
In the matter of interpretation, 0 too, they differ, with
the exception of mutuum, in being contracts of good faith
(bonae fidei), or free interpretation. In construing them
the juror is to seek behind the words of the parties their
intent, to supplement the forgetfulness of the creditor, to
protect the debtor from any inequity that would result
from the letter of the contract. The charge of the magistrate (formula, given in advance of the hearing by the
juror of evidence) prescribed that the juror (or judge of
fact) should decide what was justly due "ex bona fide,"
that is, gave him a new power in the interpretation of the
contract. To illustrate from cases: The vendor of a slave
under the consensual contract of sale was required not only
to deliver him but to care for him up to the time of delivery;
in case of culpable delay in execution he was liable for
damages. Per contra the debtor might counter-plead fraud
(dolus), or constraint (vis, metus). It was this power,
freedom of interpretation, that took the fetters from commerce, facilitated the numerous, complex, speedy transactions of a. great commercial world-empire.
Theory has attached the reason for gradually developing
this power of the judge to a third characteristic which
separates the informal and "bona fide" contracts from the
formal contracts and the mutuum. The latter were unilateral contracts, that is, put only the one party under an
obligation-made one of the parties exclusively a creditor
and the other exclusively a debtor. Only one party was put
under an obligation in the nexum, the stipulatio, the "literal"
10
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contract, the mutuum. But the later contracts which we
have considered were all bilateral, created reciprocal obligations, i. e., made each party at the same time both creditor
and debtor. Three of these immediately and inevitably
produce such reciprocal obligations. These contracts are
sale, hire and partnership. The others do not immediately
produce other obligations than to return the object, or to
execute the mandate. But they may later create the reciprocal obligation, say for the depositor to pay the depositee's
expense in preserving the object, or for the principal to pay
the agent's expenses. And actions (called actiones contrariae) were allowed in order to enforce these last obligations. Thereupon these contracts became also bilateral.
Theory says that the larger powers of interpretation were
given the judge, and the contracts made bonae lldei because
of the need of putting the judge in a position to appreciate
the whole of the contract, weigh reciprocal obligations, and
allow the just compensatio.
At any rate the contracts we have mentioned constitute
the system that Gaius and Justinian have in mind in the
well-known passages (G. 3, 89. J. 3, 13, 2.) stating that
contracts arise re, verbis, literis,and consensu. But it would
be a serious error to conclude that there developed no other
exceptions than the "real" and the "consensual" contracts
to the rule ex pacto actio non nascitur.
Imperial law recognized other exceptions-now under the
name of contracts, now under other names.
The jurist Labeo at the very beginning of the Empire,
when dealing with a case somewhat as follows: A. had
goods on B.'s boat, B. sells the goods and defaults, and the
circumstances fail to show whether the contract is one of
hire of the boat or of letting the service of the shipmaster,
-took an advanced step in deciding that in such a case the
bilateral pact, accompanied by execution by one party, entitled to a remedy. From this beginning gradually developed the general rule that bilateral pacts not already named
(nominatae) as contracts, and accompanied by execution
by one party would ground an action to compel execution
by the other party (actio praescriptisverbis, in which the
magistrate in his charge detailed the special circumstances
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and turned the case over to the jury). Such pacts formed
a further exception to the rule, ex pacto actio non nascitur,
and were called contracts innominate (without name).
Other exceptions of a bilateral nature were Zeno's emphyteusis, a special contract for lease in perpetuity, and
Justinian's pact of compromise (to compromise a case out
of court).
Again, an interesting development arises from the equity
of the praetor,-indeed is but a continuance of the function
in equity he had shown in developing the commodatum, depositurn and pignus-namely, the so-called praetorian pacts.
(pacta praetoria). For their development he used the equity
action called actio in factum. Such further exceptions to
the rule, ex pacto actio non nascitur, included the peculiar
pacts regarding effects of travelers taken in charge by common carriers (shipmasters, receptum nautarum), and innkeepers (receptum cauponum), and the pact of a banker to
pay another's debt (receptum argentarii), and a pact (made
to obtain delay) to pay a debt (already due) by a certain
date (pactum de pecunia constituta). It must not be forgotten that by Hadrian's legislation all the contents of the
praetor's edict, including the praetorian pacts, so-called, became statute law. But further yet imperial law sanctioned
by actions the pact of gift (donatio) and the pact to furnish
a dowry (dos), which conventions, though called "legal"
pacts (pacta legitima), were therefore exceptions to the
rule, that is, were genuine contracts.
To sum up, the extent of the rule ex pacto actio non nascitur has been immensely delimited by the exceptions real,
consensual, and innominate contracts, praetorian and "legal"
pacts. But in the Roman system the rule was never abrogated. Its expression is but slightly changed by the insertion of the adjective "mere," or "non-legalized." It reads
now: ex nudo pacto actio non nascitur. Even under Justinian the only remaining formal contract, stipulatio, must
be used to make binding conventions that fell outside these
exceptions. Among such were all bilateral conventions not
falling within the consensual contracts (such were, e. g.,
exchange and division), in case there had been no execution
by one party, and all unilateral pacts that were not "real"
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contracts, or praetorian, or "legal" pacts (such, e. g., were
pacts to open a credit, a unilateral pact to sell, or pact to
1
buy). 1
Edgar S. Shumway.

"But pacts that were not actionable could be set up in defence, by
way of counterplea.
Following as I have in the main Girard's treatment, I have not
emphasized the influence of the Jus Gentium with its development of
remedies for non-Romans; and the subject of "Causa," with its historical relation to the English doctrine of "Consideration," seemed to
me to demand a paper by itself. As suggesting such a study and at
the same time furnishing the distinction of a case on the rule "ex
pacto," etc., I subjoin: Just. Codex 2, 3, io, "nec obesse tibi poterit,
quod dici solet, ex pacto actionem non nasci. Tunc enim hoc iure
utimur cum pactum nudum est: alioquin, cum pecunia datur et aliquid
de reddenda ea convenit, utilis est condictio." A. has furnished the
groom X. a dowry for M., X.'s bride, and X. has entered into a pact
with A. to return the dowry if the marriage terminate. The condition has arisen. The pact is not "bare" (nudum) but clothed in the
"causa,'--inthis case, of course, "consideration executed by one party."

